The first Canadian settlement between ACoC and ANiC has been approved, as the two Ottawa ANiC parishes have ratified the agreed settlement with the diocese. ANiC's press release is here; the diocese's news release is here
The settlement conforms to the template that I have been saying for some time would work in a diocese in which more than one parish has left. One ANiC parish keeps its building; the other one leaves it. The one that keeps its building pays the diocese "a substantial sum of money". Meanwhile ANiC states that "By agreement, precise details of the division of assets between the parishes and diocese are to remain confidential." What that means, we may infer, is that the diocese will pay out some money to St. Alban's, which will provide a nice start to their building fund. The diocese's insistence on a confidentiality agreement conforms with what has been suggested to me by a lawyer friend with reason to know how a rational diocese might approach a situation like this. A diocese would not want it to be known that it is paying out money to a departing parish, so it would insist on a confidentiality agreement, so that the settlement may be described in a way that obscures the fact of such a payment. That is why a multi-parish settlement can be easier than a single-parish ones; the financial implications can be blurred so that ACoC is not seen to be doing anything that might amount to a significant concession to ANiC.
A fillip I didn't think of is that the departing congregations have been required to change their names. This might seem to be rather unnecessarily ruthless of the diocese, but it allows the diocese to maintain its formal position. The parish of St. George's has not left the diocese; rather it has been disestablished, and its building sold to a worshipping group with a different name. St Alban's parish has not left; rather its clergy have left, apparently starting some sectarian congregation with a different name, worshipping in a different building. Anglican worship carries on in the same building, with all present St. Alban's members invited to continue worshipping there. (Where they will find a congregation for the "continuing" ACoC St. Alban's is another question, but one to worry about another day.) By returning Anglican Social Services to the building, the diocese maintains the pretext that it wants it because it has use of it.
It's important that things are set up so that both sides may maintain their formal position about the dispute, to validate their narrative. Most of us normal people, upon finalizing such a settlement, would thank God and move on. But there are always some ditchers, particularly in a group of people with strong beliefs like ANiC, who are insistent on carrying on the fighting and demonstrating to all that they won the settlement. Thus Kate Sanderson, at the always-irresponsible Anglican Essentials blog, insists that the by settling the diocese acknowledged that St. Alban's had the right to their building, which it does not, as if anyone with any sense cares now. (She also risks breaking the confidentiality agreement by claiming that the percentage asset division in the settlement: 40/60 ANiC/ACoC if you want to know. So much for an agreement about confidentiality with ANiC!)
Even without knowing the amounts of the monies being exchanged, it may safely be judged that both sides are better off than if they had been engaged in a lawsuit since the time the congregations left. +Chapman deserves credit for acting as a faithful steward of that which was entrusted to him, avoiding the needless squandering of hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees.
Could others follow the example of this settlement? The problem is finding a rational ACoC diocese. In New Westminster it's rather late, and neither side would seem likely to surrender possession of St. John's Shaughnessy voluntarily in any case, while a sensible settlement would involve selling it and splitting the proceeds. In Niagara the sensible thing would be to sell Good Shepherd (which would be a prudent move anyway) and divide the spoils, and then split ownership of the other two properties . But +Niagara does not seem to view the situation rationally anyway; the lawsuit is already well under way so hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees have already been squandered; and the provocative presence of Charlie Masters+ in the diocese inhibits any settlement -- particularly one in which he retains his building.
Showing posts with label Anglican Network in Canada. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Anglican Network in Canada. Show all posts
Monday, February 14, 2011
Wednesday, January 6, 2010
The Strange Death of the Original-Principles Trust (Pt 2)
Kelleher J.’s approach is to treat the application of the neutral principles of law, which is step one of the process, as both beginning and end of it. The cases he cites in support of his approach are all irrelevant to the case at hand. Two cases are cited in support of the proposition that questions of church doctrine are inappropriate subjects for judicial determination. Kelleher J. notes in particular that one of these cases referred approvingly to the U. S. Supreme Court’s groundbreaking 1979 decision in Jones v. Wolf (8). However it is not necessary to look to cases relying on American constitutional law in support of the doctrine that Anglo-Canadian courts ordinarily refrain from determining issues of church doctrine. That also is a centuries-old common-law doctrine, and the inquiry into fundamental original doctrines is a carefully carved out exception to it, as Professor Ogilvie explains in her text. Kelleher J. further cites Protection of the Holy Virgin Russian Orthodox Church (9), where the Quebec Court of Appeal declined a request for a declaration that to be a member of the parish, a person must observe the teachings of the church. There was no trust argument in that case so the refusal of the court to get involved in matters of doctrine has no relevance here. The portion of the trial court decision cited an Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Balkou v. Gouleff (11). In that case the court was asked to determine whether church doctrine forbade membership in Communist organizations. Again, this is not a church property case and has no bearing on the fundamental-principle doctrine.
The oddest citation in support of this approach comes in paragraph 252, where Kelleher J. cites a statement by Burton J.A. in Itter v. Howe (1896)(12) in support of the proposition that “[t]he notion of civil courts deferring to ecclesiastical authority on questions of doctrine has deep provenance in Canada.” As a refutation of the fundamental-principles doctrine, this reference is negated more than adequately by Kelleher J. himself in paragraphs 268 and 269, where he discusses the case and demonstrates that the fundamental-principle rule was applied in it. The dissidents lost in Itter v. Howe, but the principle itself was recognized --as it always has been until Bentley v. New Westminster was released.
The other argument Kelleher J. uses is that trust doctrine does not apply in the case of a hierarchical church such as the Anglican Church, which was an elaborate and complicated set of rules, procedures, and authorities. This appears to be an acceptance of the defendants’ novel argument, also derivative of American categorizations, that the trust doctrine applies only in congregational churches, and not hierarchical ones. I have not been able to find any case law cited by either Kelleher J. or the defendants in support of this proposition; I believe none exists. The doctrine has always applied to hierarchical and non-hierarchical churches; to churches with elaborately constructed internal mechanisms and those with no written statements of doctrine at all. The analysis has been applied to eastern Orthodox churches which are more hierarchical than the Anglican Church. It has been applied to the Methodist Episcopal Church in the 1830s, a hierarchical church within the legal meaning of the term and one with a more detailed and precise set of rules and internal procedures than Anglicans have. There is no basis for this argument in either precedent or logic; the ill that the fundamental-principles doctrine attempts to remedy is the same whether the abandonment has occurred by an arbitrary decision in a single congregation with no written doctrinal statement or a thoroughly debated decision in a denomination with 500 pages of constitution and canons.
What would impel Kelleher J. to reject the existing doctrine so brazenly? I want to discuss this because orthodox Christians succumb all too easily to the temptation, and I use the word literally, to attribute all adverse judicial decisions to the implacable hostility of the secular world and its rejection of the truth in Christ. It must be acknowledged that in any case where judicial bias, open or covert, influences a decision, the probability is great that the relevant bias will be against orthodox Christianity. However in Bentley the possibility that the adverse decision was actuated by bias can be completely dismissed. A companion issue in the case involved the disposition of the Chun bequest, a $2.2 million building fund claimed by both a dissenting and a successor ACoC congregation. Without discussing the trust issues there, it may be said that the choice of beneficiary was something close to an act of pure equitable discretion. The departing ACNA congregation was awarded control of the Chun bequest. It is impossible that a judge motivated by hostility to orthodox doctrine would have made that decision.
The reason that the place of the fundamental-principles doctrine could be seen in advance of this litigation to be somewhat precarious is that it has an archaic air to it. Aspects of it seem to belong to a bygone age, to a time when any educated English gentleman, of whatever religious belief, who might find himself on the bench could be expected to know the basic doctrines of not only the Church of England but the major sectarian groups (and even of “Papists”, as they were described in one of the major early House of Lords precedents). Like the law lords in the case marking the high water mark of the doctrine, Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun (13) (see Wikipedia entry), a judge could be expected to engage in learned discussion on the degree of significance of an alteration of the doctrine of double predestination by the adoption of the statement that “God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance.” In a post-Christian age, we cannot expect judges to bring with them that kind of expertise. Nor are Christian churches the only religious institutions to which the doctrine applies. In the English case of Varsani v Jesani , a Hindu sect’s founder was believed to be the incarnation of the Supreme Being, and a division arose over the extent to which his successor also enjoyed divine status. Carnwith J. was faced with the task of determining which faction (if either) had deviated from the sect’s original fundamental principles, in a sect with no written doctrinal statement that could be adverted to. Understandably, he balked, and found a solution in a statutory scheme that allowed division of properties between the factions. There is no equivalent statutory provision in Canada, so a judge here would have to make that challenging factual determination.
The necessary entanglement of the state in church affairs of the fundamental-doctrines rule leads activist judges to look for some way to extinguish it. The strength of this sentiment may be seem from the reaction to the decision by Don Hutchinson, general legal counsel for the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada (EFC). It is churches like EFC members who derive the most benefit from a doctrine protecting established orthodoxy. Despite this, Hutchinson said “he found it appropriate that Justice Kelleher "respected the religious freedom of the Anglican communion" by allowing internal Anglican processes to resolve internal Anglican disputes. "We don't want the courts or government making final decisions on the beliefs, practice and polity of a church."
So far so good as to the chances of a successful appeal by the ANiC churches, who at the time of writing are in a discernment process to determine whether they should appeal. (A notice of appeal has been filed to meet the deadline.) However, as we shall subsequently see, the situation gets much stickier when we look at ANiC's ability to show that the ACoC has indeed violated the original principles doctrine as the coirts have applied it.
NOTES
(8) (1979), 443 U.S. 595, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 16
(9) (1st ed., at 209).
(10) [2001] O.J. No. 438 (S.C.); varied 2002 CanLII 3570 (ON C.A.), 30 B.L.R. (3d) 315, 167 O.A.C. 138
(11) (1989) 68 O.R. (2d) 574.
(12) (1896), 23 O.A.R. 256, [1896] O.J. No. 31 (QL) (C.A.)
(13) [1904] AC 515 (H.L.)
The oddest citation in support of this approach comes in paragraph 252, where Kelleher J. cites a statement by Burton J.A. in Itter v. Howe (1896)(12) in support of the proposition that “[t]he notion of civil courts deferring to ecclesiastical authority on questions of doctrine has deep provenance in Canada.” As a refutation of the fundamental-principles doctrine, this reference is negated more than adequately by Kelleher J. himself in paragraphs 268 and 269, where he discusses the case and demonstrates that the fundamental-principle rule was applied in it. The dissidents lost in Itter v. Howe, but the principle itself was recognized --as it always has been until Bentley v. New Westminster was released.
The other argument Kelleher J. uses is that trust doctrine does not apply in the case of a hierarchical church such as the Anglican Church, which was an elaborate and complicated set of rules, procedures, and authorities. This appears to be an acceptance of the defendants’ novel argument, also derivative of American categorizations, that the trust doctrine applies only in congregational churches, and not hierarchical ones. I have not been able to find any case law cited by either Kelleher J. or the defendants in support of this proposition; I believe none exists. The doctrine has always applied to hierarchical and non-hierarchical churches; to churches with elaborately constructed internal mechanisms and those with no written statements of doctrine at all. The analysis has been applied to eastern Orthodox churches which are more hierarchical than the Anglican Church. It has been applied to the Methodist Episcopal Church in the 1830s, a hierarchical church within the legal meaning of the term and one with a more detailed and precise set of rules and internal procedures than Anglicans have. There is no basis for this argument in either precedent or logic; the ill that the fundamental-principles doctrine attempts to remedy is the same whether the abandonment has occurred by an arbitrary decision in a single congregation with no written doctrinal statement or a thoroughly debated decision in a denomination with 500 pages of constitution and canons.
What would impel Kelleher J. to reject the existing doctrine so brazenly? I want to discuss this because orthodox Christians succumb all too easily to the temptation, and I use the word literally, to attribute all adverse judicial decisions to the implacable hostility of the secular world and its rejection of the truth in Christ. It must be acknowledged that in any case where judicial bias, open or covert, influences a decision, the probability is great that the relevant bias will be against orthodox Christianity. However in Bentley the possibility that the adverse decision was actuated by bias can be completely dismissed. A companion issue in the case involved the disposition of the Chun bequest, a $2.2 million building fund claimed by both a dissenting and a successor ACoC congregation. Without discussing the trust issues there, it may be said that the choice of beneficiary was something close to an act of pure equitable discretion. The departing ACNA congregation was awarded control of the Chun bequest. It is impossible that a judge motivated by hostility to orthodox doctrine would have made that decision.
The reason that the place of the fundamental-principles doctrine could be seen in advance of this litigation to be somewhat precarious is that it has an archaic air to it. Aspects of it seem to belong to a bygone age, to a time when any educated English gentleman, of whatever religious belief, who might find himself on the bench could be expected to know the basic doctrines of not only the Church of England but the major sectarian groups (and even of “Papists”, as they were described in one of the major early House of Lords precedents). Like the law lords in the case marking the high water mark of the doctrine, Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun (13) (see Wikipedia entry), a judge could be expected to engage in learned discussion on the degree of significance of an alteration of the doctrine of double predestination by the adoption of the statement that “God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance.” In a post-Christian age, we cannot expect judges to bring with them that kind of expertise. Nor are Christian churches the only religious institutions to which the doctrine applies. In the English case of Varsani v Jesani , a Hindu sect’s founder was believed to be the incarnation of the Supreme Being, and a division arose over the extent to which his successor also enjoyed divine status. Carnwith J. was faced with the task of determining which faction (if either) had deviated from the sect’s original fundamental principles, in a sect with no written doctrinal statement that could be adverted to. Understandably, he balked, and found a solution in a statutory scheme that allowed division of properties between the factions. There is no equivalent statutory provision in Canada, so a judge here would have to make that challenging factual determination.
The necessary entanglement of the state in church affairs of the fundamental-doctrines rule leads activist judges to look for some way to extinguish it. The strength of this sentiment may be seem from the reaction to the decision by Don Hutchinson, general legal counsel for the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada (EFC). It is churches like EFC members who derive the most benefit from a doctrine protecting established orthodoxy. Despite this, Hutchinson said “he found it appropriate that Justice Kelleher "respected the religious freedom of the Anglican communion" by allowing internal Anglican processes to resolve internal Anglican disputes. "We don't want the courts or government making final decisions on the beliefs, practice and polity of a church."
So far so good as to the chances of a successful appeal by the ANiC churches, who at the time of writing are in a discernment process to determine whether they should appeal. (A notice of appeal has been filed to meet the deadline.) However, as we shall subsequently see, the situation gets much stickier when we look at ANiC's ability to show that the ACoC has indeed violated the original principles doctrine as the coirts have applied it.
NOTES
(8) (1979), 443 U.S. 595, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 16
(9) (1st ed., at 209).
(10) [2001] O.J. No. 438 (S.C.); varied 2002 CanLII 3570 (ON C.A.), 30 B.L.R. (3d) 315, 167 O.A.C. 138
(11) (1989) 68 O.R. (2d) 574.
(12) (1896), 23 O.A.R. 256, [1896] O.J. No. 31 (QL) (C.A.)
(13) [1904] AC 515 (H.L.)
The Strange Death of the Original-Principles Trust (Pt 1)
In the last decade, congregations in the Anglican diocese of New Westminster have had to respond to the heterodox doctrinal positions taken by the diocese and its Bishop Michael Ingham. One option was to separate from the Anglican Church of Canada ("ACoC") and affiliate with an orthodox Anglican province overseas. They might then wonder what property rights their congregations would retain. There was a rule of law on the subject on which they might have thought they could rely. It has been in place in the United Kingdom and Canada for over 150 years. Its validity had never been called into question. It had been taken for granted as a valid rule of law in the most recent cases on the subject: in Scotland in 2005 (1), in England in 1998 (2), in the Supreme Court of Canada in 1970 (3), and in British Columbia itself in 1981 (4). It has been summarized by Professor Ogilvie, in her text on church law, as follows:
In Bentley v. New Westminster, (available free at http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009/2009bcsc1608/2009bcsc1608.html) (6) Mr Justice Stephen Kelleher, deciding ownership of the property of 4 orthodox Anglican congregations who had left the diocese, came to the surprising conclusion that this rule of law no longer existed. Or at least that he was able to decide a question of ownership where departure from fundamental doctrines was alleged while ignoring the rule, which amounts to the same thing. We have some detailed eyewitness accounts of the trial and can reconstruct how the justice was led to this novel conclusion, and they testify to the value of audacity in litigation strategy; the defendant diocese simply denied that any such doctrine existed.
Reading Kelleher J.’s legal analysis (beginning at para. 247), we can see that he has gotten off track, very early in his analysis, when he summarizes the defendant diocese’s position:
First the neutral principles of property law are applied, then, if it is alleged that the title holders at law have abandoned the original fundamental principles for the furtherance of which the property is held, the special original-principles trust test is applied. That’s the law of Canada.
NOTES
(1) Free Church Of Scotland v. General Assembly Of The Free Church Of Scotland [2005] ScotCS CSOH_46
(2) Varsani v Jesani [1998] EWCA Civ 630 (3 April 1998); http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1998/630.html
(3) Hofer v. Hofer, [1970] S.C.R. 958, 1970 CanLII 161 (S.C.C.), 73 W.W.R. (N.S.) 644
(4) Chong v. Lee, 1981 CanLII 732 (BC S.C.), 29 B.C.L.R. 13
(5) M. H. Ogilvie, Religious Institutions and the Law in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2nd ed., 2003, at 293-94
(6) 2009 BCSC 1608 (CanLII), http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009/2009bcsc1608/2009bcsc1608.html
(7) Ogilvie, (1st ed., 1996,) at 211.
TO BE CONTINUED
It is a well-settled principle of law that the property of a religious institution must be held and applied to the original purposes for which that institution was founded, that is, for the original "trust". Such property cannot be redirected to other purposes by a mere majority of members, and where a majority decides upon a diversion, the property remains in trust for the dissenting minority (even one person) who adheres to the original trust for which the property was given. (5)There are a number of qualifications that need to be applied to this statement of law, most importantly that it is only the upholding of those doctrines that can be classified as fundamental that form the original trust, but that the rule of law existed has never been in dispute.
In Bentley v. New Westminster, (available free at http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009/2009bcsc1608/2009bcsc1608.html) (6) Mr Justice Stephen Kelleher, deciding ownership of the property of 4 orthodox Anglican congregations who had left the diocese, came to the surprising conclusion that this rule of law no longer existed. Or at least that he was able to decide a question of ownership where departure from fundamental doctrines was alleged while ignoring the rule, which amounts to the same thing. We have some detailed eyewitness accounts of the trial and can reconstruct how the justice was led to this novel conclusion, and they testify to the value of audacity in litigation strategy; the defendant diocese simply denied that any such doctrine existed.
Reading Kelleher J.’s legal analysis (beginning at para. 247), we can see that he has gotten off track, very early in his analysis, when he summarizes the defendant diocese’s position:
the defendants contend that the issues in dispute can be resolved by reference to statutes and canon law, and that it is unnecessary to turn to trust principles....What the defendants advance is akin to the "neutral principles of law" approach that American courts routinely apply in resolving church property disputes....Kelleher J. goes on to explain this so-called neutral principles of law approach, citing a recent California case:
The court should consider sources such as the deeds to the property in dispute, the local church’s articles of incorporation, the general church’s constitution, canons, and rules, and relevant statutes, including statutes specifically concerning religious property, such as [charitable corporations legislation].The reader’s first reaction will be to wonder what a principle of law developed by American courts in order to bring American church property law into compliance with the First Amendment to the American constitution by avoiding excessive entanglement of church and state has to do with the application of the well-established church property law of British Columbia. Kelleher J. "acknowledges that the neutral principles of law approach is a consequence of the First Amendment’s separation of church and state" in para. 249. But upon further consideration, this first reaction, that we are faced here with a pure doctrinal innovation based upon an arbitrary transplanting of American law, is misplaced. The neutral principles of law approach is not a new American approach. Properly understood, it is not an alternative to the Anglo-Canadian fundamental-purposes trust approach. The approaches are complementary, and have heretofore coexisted. Anglo-Canadian law, although having no need of the name, has always applied the "neutral principles of law" approach to answer the first question in any property dispute: who owns the property? And further, where necessary, do the holders of legal title hold the property on trust, express or implied, for some other entity within the denomination? And then, once these questions have been decided, once the "neutral principles of law" approach has been exhausted, where there has been a division within a church, there remains the question of whether one side of the division has abandoned the fundamental doctrines upon which the church has been based. For, to quote Prof. Ogilvie again,
"...regardless of denomination or polity, where a congregation or denomination decides to change its fundamental doctrinal standards from those for which the property was given, the property is to be held on trust for those members who adhere to the original standard." (7)11 Canadian cases are cited for this proposition, and more could be found, without even counting cases from Great Britain where the doctrine was formed and evolved.
First the neutral principles of property law are applied, then, if it is alleged that the title holders at law have abandoned the original fundamental principles for the furtherance of which the property is held, the special original-principles trust test is applied. That’s the law of Canada.
NOTES
(1) Free Church Of Scotland v. General Assembly Of The Free Church Of Scotland [2005] ScotCS CSOH_46
(2) Varsani v Jesani [1998] EWCA Civ 630 (3 April 1998); http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1998/630.html
(3) Hofer v. Hofer, [1970] S.C.R. 958, 1970 CanLII 161 (S.C.C.), 73 W.W.R. (N.S.) 644
(4) Chong v. Lee, 1981 CanLII 732 (BC S.C.), 29 B.C.L.R. 13
(5) M. H. Ogilvie, Religious Institutions and the Law in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2nd ed., 2003, at 293-94
(6) 2009 BCSC 1608 (CanLII), http://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2009/2009bcsc1608/2009bcsc1608.html
(7) Ogilvie, (1st ed., 1996,) at 211.
TO BE CONTINUED
Monday, October 26, 2009
Godly Order: ACNA and Liturgy
The following is an edited version of an article published in Praiseworthy News, the newsletter of the Church of the Good Shepherd, St, Catharines, V. 4, #3, May 2009)
The upcoming provincial assembly meeting in Texas in June at which the ACNA constitution and canons will be ratified is a reminder that we are now inevitably entering a period of liturgical reform. We are no longer tied to the Book of Alternative Services. The Green Book had to be composed so as to be consistent with liberal theology. The result was a production symptomizing the ills that would lead to the disintegration of the Anglican Church of Canada. Those of you who attended the parish conference with Bishop Malcolm Harding may remember that he quoted and spoke often of the English writer and evangelist Michael Green. Green taught at Regent College in Canada for five years and led evangelical campaigns here. Speaking here, he distinguished two groups in the church those: who prefer old wine in old skins (Book of Common Prayer adherents) and those who prefer new wine in new wineskins (contemporary language services with modern music etc. especially to reach the unchurched). Green said:
The ACNA draft Constitution and Canons contain a fundamental declaration, described as essential for membership, relating to service books:
Numerous jurisdictions have adopted modern language versions of the 1662 book, and it would certainly be consistent with the principles of ACNA to use experimentally a 1662-style modern language service. I compiled a list of modernized 1662 services in the Anglican communion and looked forward to reviewing them. Alas, all of them were disappointing. They do not really seem modern. They seem to modernize language that should have been kept, while leaving in place that language that needs to be modernized. A sample of these versions, the communion rite of the Anglican Missions in America, may be found here.
The ACNA Constitution inclusion of "the Books which preceded it" as the standard for Anglican doctrine and discipline includes both the books of 1549 and 1552, which stand near the ends of the Anglican spectrum of churchmanship, meaning that any orthodox liturgy ever used in the Anglican communion can been deemed consistent with ACNA liturgical standards.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dumping the BAS would mean that we enter a time of liturgical experimentation. For those who were Anglican worshippers seventies, the idea of liturgical experimentation may bring back unpleasant memories. Never knowing when opening the church door what manner of sloppily photocopied trial liturgy one was going to be handed when o And we worshippers resist changes in liturgy, whatever dissatisfaction they harbour with the liturgy they have. Such resistance should not be disdained as mere obstinate opposition to change. Familiarity is one of the main reasons for having a liturgy. As C. S. Lewis says in Letters to Malcolm
ACNA has a Prayer Book Committee which is working away behind the scenes even as we speak. I doubt that there will ever be an ACNA prayer book in the sense of a book containing the entire set of permissible services in ACNA. To respect the diversity of uses throughout North America, it would have to be a Heinz prayer book with 57 varieties of eucharistic rite. There is more likely to be a book which collects revised and reformed versions of various rites which are liked by significant parts of ACNA.
Worshippers at the early service need only decide whether they are satisfied with the doctored version of the BCP rite found in the Green Book, wish to return to the original, or consider any of the other traditional BCPs from around the world.
More experimental action is more likely to occur at the contemporary language service. In looking for a new liturgy that is worthy of trial, we seek something that 1) expresses orthodox, and in particular evangelical theology; 2) is written in modern language; 3) is written to the best standard of liturgical language, combining precision with beauty, elevated and dignified, the product of the offering of all our talents including those of the mind. Condition 3 is the hard one. Writing liturgically in modern language is difficult. It is a challenge to use a tone and style that evokes a sense of the numinous in the language of the marketplace. We can only rely on the observation of C. S. Lewis that the best liturgical language results not from artificial attempts to be lofty in tone and extravagant in metaphor, but from "the prose of men who are intent upon their matter and write only to be understood."
In doing this research I have found that many ANiC churches are not only using non-BAS liturgies, but are using rites that are originally drawn from other sources and then edited and changed by the parish (i.e., the rector) itself as it sees fit. I compiled a list of 6 suggested sources of evangelical modern language liturgy, from Australia, England, South Africa and the United States. Unfortunately there are none I could personally recommend. Those of them that attempt to use "lofty" liturgical language fail at it. God placed no Cranmers on the committees who compiled those books
Another liturgy to be considered is the currently very popular Kenyan Rite, mentioned favourably by Bishop Malcolm when he was here. (It may be seen on the Internet:here) Worshippers who are not liturgically inclined often them dull and cold. The Kenyan Rite is not dull or cold. The rite satisfies many worshippers who have picky standards of liturgical form, while expressing in vivid language sheer joy in worshipping God. The rite has been used by a number of ANiC parishes. If we decide to enter unto experimentation, the Kenyan rite should be one of the rites used
The upcoming provincial assembly meeting in Texas in June at which the ACNA constitution and canons will be ratified is a reminder that we are now inevitably entering a period of liturgical reform. We are no longer tied to the Book of Alternative Services. The Green Book had to be composed so as to be consistent with liberal theology. The result was a production symptomizing the ills that would lead to the disintegration of the Anglican Church of Canada. Those of you who attended the parish conference with Bishop Malcolm Harding may remember that he quoted and spoke often of the English writer and evangelist Michael Green. Green taught at Regent College in Canada for five years and led evangelical campaigns here. Speaking here, he distinguished two groups in the church those: who prefer old wine in old skins (Book of Common Prayer adherents) and those who prefer new wine in new wineskins (contemporary language services with modern music etc. especially to reach the unchurched). Green said:
The old wine skins have an integrity. And so does the new wine. But if you try to mix the two, as the Book of Alternative Services does, the danger of splitting both is considerable. The B.A.S. does not really speak to those outside the church. I hope it was designed for them but, frankly, I think we have to confess that it is largely a failure in that respect. It doesn't speak to the outsider.... The language is infelicitous and it lacks depth...The end of the century has come and gone, but the time for revision still lies ahead. I can't imagine ANiC churches still using the BAS ten years from now.
Actually, if you look at the whole family of revisions within the Anglican communion, I'm afraid we've been saddled with about the worst of those revisions... [W]e should contend for a competent, sensitive and spiritually profound revision of the alternative services when the time comes up towards the end of the century.
The ACNA draft Constitution and Canons contain a fundamental declaration, described as essential for membership, relating to service books:
6. We receive The Book of Common Prayer as set forth by the Church of England in 1662, together with the Ordinal attached to the same, as a standard for Anglican doctrine and discipline, and, with the Books which preceded it, as the standard for the Anglican tradition of worship.Some people reading this declarayion may be alarmed at first glance that they are going to be forced to give up their current liturgies for the 1662 BCP, a book which they have never heard of, written in three-century-old language. That won't happen. The recognition of the 1662 book stems from the high regard held for it by the African primates, who established it as the standard of GAFCON worship. The 1662 book is regarded as more faithful to evangelical standards than some of its successors, particularly the American 1928 BCP. However there are only a handful of North American parishes who use the 1662 rite just as is. The whole of ACNA is not going to be forced to adopt the 1662 BCP any time soon.
Numerous jurisdictions have adopted modern language versions of the 1662 book, and it would certainly be consistent with the principles of ACNA to use experimentally a 1662-style modern language service. I compiled a list of modernized 1662 services in the Anglican communion and looked forward to reviewing them. Alas, all of them were disappointing. They do not really seem modern. They seem to modernize language that should have been kept, while leaving in place that language that needs to be modernized. A sample of these versions, the communion rite of the Anglican Missions in America, may be found here.
The ACNA Constitution inclusion of "the Books which preceded it" as the standard for Anglican doctrine and discipline includes both the books of 1549 and 1552, which stand near the ends of the Anglican spectrum of churchmanship, meaning that any orthodox liturgy ever used in the Anglican communion can been deemed consistent with ACNA liturgical standards.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dumping the BAS would mean that we enter a time of liturgical experimentation. For those who were Anglican worshippers seventies, the idea of liturgical experimentation may bring back unpleasant memories. Never knowing when opening the church door what manner of sloppily photocopied trial liturgy one was going to be handed when o And we worshippers resist changes in liturgy, whatever dissatisfaction they harbour with the liturgy they have. Such resistance should not be disdained as mere obstinate opposition to change. Familiarity is one of the main reasons for having a liturgy. As C. S. Lewis says in Letters to Malcolm
I think our business as laymen is to take what we are given and make the best of it. And I think we should find this a great deal easier if what we were given was always and everywhere the same....(There is of course a contrary argument, for spontaneity and ecstatic expression on worship, which in a church with a heavy charismatic influence must be recognized as well. I believe it is possible to have a liturgical service which combines the best of both approaches. That is an argument for being very thoughtful about what we are doing, because it implies that there must also be a manner of service that combines the worst of both approaches, and if we approach the problem lazily we are likely to get it.)
To judge from their practice, very few Anglican clergymen take this view. It looks as if they believed people can lured to go to church by incessant brightenings, lengthenings, abridgements, simplifications amd complications of the service.... Novelty may fix our attention not even on the service but on the celebrant. You know what I mean. Try as one may to exclude it, the question, "What on earth is he up to now?" will intrude....
Every service is a structure of acts and words through which we receive a sacrament, or repent, or supplicate, or adore. And it enables us to do these things best -- if you like it "works" best--when through long familiarity, we don't have to think about it. As long as you notice, and have to count, the steps, you are not yet dancing but only learning to dance....The perfect church service would be one we were almost unaware of; our attention would have been on God.
ACNA has a Prayer Book Committee which is working away behind the scenes even as we speak. I doubt that there will ever be an ACNA prayer book in the sense of a book containing the entire set of permissible services in ACNA. To respect the diversity of uses throughout North America, it would have to be a Heinz prayer book with 57 varieties of eucharistic rite. There is more likely to be a book which collects revised and reformed versions of various rites which are liked by significant parts of ACNA.
Worshippers at the early service need only decide whether they are satisfied with the doctored version of the BCP rite found in the Green Book, wish to return to the original, or consider any of the other traditional BCPs from around the world.
More experimental action is more likely to occur at the contemporary language service. In looking for a new liturgy that is worthy of trial, we seek something that 1) expresses orthodox, and in particular evangelical theology; 2) is written in modern language; 3) is written to the best standard of liturgical language, combining precision with beauty, elevated and dignified, the product of the offering of all our talents including those of the mind. Condition 3 is the hard one. Writing liturgically in modern language is difficult. It is a challenge to use a tone and style that evokes a sense of the numinous in the language of the marketplace. We can only rely on the observation of C. S. Lewis that the best liturgical language results not from artificial attempts to be lofty in tone and extravagant in metaphor, but from "the prose of men who are intent upon their matter and write only to be understood."
In doing this research I have found that many ANiC churches are not only using non-BAS liturgies, but are using rites that are originally drawn from other sources and then edited and changed by the parish (i.e., the rector) itself as it sees fit. I compiled a list of 6 suggested sources of evangelical modern language liturgy, from Australia, England, South Africa and the United States. Unfortunately there are none I could personally recommend. Those of them that attempt to use "lofty" liturgical language fail at it. God placed no Cranmers on the committees who compiled those books
Another liturgy to be considered is the currently very popular Kenyan Rite, mentioned favourably by Bishop Malcolm when he was here. (It may be seen on the Internet:here) Worshippers who are not liturgically inclined often them dull and cold. The Kenyan Rite is not dull or cold. The rite satisfies many worshippers who have picky standards of liturgical form, while expressing in vivid language sheer joy in worshipping God. The rite has been used by a number of ANiC parishes. If we decide to enter unto experimentation, the Kenyan rite should be one of the rites used
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
